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*16 Attorneys for Plaintiffs*  
*17 and Proposed Class*

**18 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**

**19 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

**20 WESTERN DIVISION – LOS ANGELES**

**21 STEVEN J. BRETT; AMERICA**  
**22 MUNSON; SCOTT ABLES,**  
**23 individually and on behalf of all**  
**24 others similarly situated,**

**25 Plaintiffs,**

**26 vs.**

**27 BROOKS BROTHERS GROUP,**  
**28 INC., a Delaware corporation,**

**Defendant.**

CASE NO.: 2:17-cv-04309-DMG-E

**SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION  
COMPLAINT**

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

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1 Plaintiffs, America Munson, Steven J. Brett, and Scott Ables ("Plaintiffs"),  
2 individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, bring this action based  
3 upon personal knowledge as to themselves and their own acts, and as to all other  
4 matters upon information and belief, based upon, *inter alia*, the investigations of  
5 their attorneys.

6 **I. NATURE OF THE ACTION**

7 1. Tens of thousands of customers every year shop at Brooks Brothers  
8 Group, Inc. (hereafter as either "Brooks Brothers" or "Defendant"), known for  
9 their high-quality suits. Consumers expect the highest quality merchandise and  
10 services from Brooks Brothers. What consumers did not expect was that at 223  
11 store locations, for a period of 11 months, customers' information was being  
12 collected by an unauthorized third party.

13 2. Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated  
14 persons (hereafter "Class Members"), bring this class action based on California  
15 law to secure redress for Brooks Brothers' reckless and negligent violations of its  
16 customers' privacy rights. Plaintiffs and Class Members are former Brooks  
17 Brothers customers who shopped at some of their 223 stores in the U.S. and  
18 Puerto Rico during the period of April 4, 2016 to March 1, 2017.

19 3. Plaintiffs and Class Members suffered injuries as a result of a  
20 security breach compromising Brooks Brothers store customers' names, credit  
21 and debit card account numbers, card expiration dates, and card verification  
22 codes, which included Personal Identifiable Information, in addition to other  
23 private information as described below ("PII").<sup>1</sup>

24 \_\_\_\_\_  
25 <sup>1</sup> Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.81 defines Personal Information to mean the following:  
26 (A) An individual's first name or first initial and his or her last  
27 name in combination with any one or more of the following data  
28 elements, when either the name or the data elements are not  
encrypted or redacted:  
(i) Social security number.



1 Brooks Brother’s locations in California: Napa, San Francisco, and San Mateo.  
2 Plaintiff has provided her PII to Defendant at all times that she has made a  
3 purchase with Defendant. Shortly after the breach, Plaintiff’s debit and credit  
4 card information was accessed by hackers. Plaintiff Munson has never been  
5 victimized by a data breach other than Brooks Brothers’. Plaintiff Munson has  
6 used her Brooks Brothers credit card and at least two different debit cards for  
7 different purchases with Defendant for a number of times during the timeframe of  
8 the data breach. One of the at least two debit cards that Plaintiff Munson used to  
9 make purchases at Defendant’s stores had to be cancelled due to Plaintiff Munson  
10 finding fraudulent activity in her account. In addition, Plaintiff has to purchase  
11 credit and personal identity monitoring service to alert her to potential  
12 misappropriation of her identity and to combat the risk of further identity theft.  
13 Exposure of Plaintiff’s identifying personal information has placed her at  
14 imminent, immediate and continuing risk of further identity theft-related harm.  
15 Plaintiff Munson also suffered from the deprivation of the value of her PII and  
16 the lost benefit of the bargain.

17 7. Plaintiff Steven J. Brett (“Plaintiff Brett“) is a California citizen  
18 residing in Cabazon, California. Plaintiff is a long-time customer of Defendant,  
19 who has shopped a number of times at Defendant’s physical stores, including  
20 before, during, and after the alleged timeframe of the data breach. Plaintiff has  
21 provided his personal identifying information to Defendant at all times that he has  
22 made a purchase. Shortly after the breach, Plaintiff’s debit and credit card  
23 information was accessed by hackers. In addition, Plaintiff has to purchase credit  
24 and personal identity monitoring services to alert him to potential misappropriation  
25 of his identity and to combat risk of further identity theft. Exposure of Plaintiff’s  
26 identifying personal information has placed him at imminent, immediate and  
27 continuing risk of further identity theft-related harm. Plaintiff Brett also suffered  
28 from the deprivation of the value of his PII and the lost benefit of the bargain.

1 8. Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and on behalf of all  
2 others similarly situated; namely, all individuals who have made a purchase at  
3 any of Brooks Brothers' 223 stores during the period of April 4, 2016 to March 1,  
4 2017. Plaintiffs' and Class Members' PII is currently being sold on the black  
5 market.

6 9. Defendant Brooks Brothers is a Delaware corporation with its  
7 principal place of business in New York, New York. Brooks Brothers has  
8 registered with the California Secretary of State to be served for any action filed  
9 against it in California through its agent for service of process: Corporation  
10 Service Company, 2710 Gateway Oaks Dr., Ste 150N, Sacramento, California,  
11 95833.

### 12 III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

13 10. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the state law claims  
14 asserted herein pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2),  
15 since some of the Class Members are citizens of a State different from the  
16 Defendant and, upon the original filing of this complaint, members of the putative  
17 Plaintiff class resided in states around the country; there are more than 100 putative  
18 class members; and the amount in controversy exceeds \$5 million.

19 11. The Court also has personal jurisdiction over the parties because, on  
20 information and belief, Defendant conducts a major part of its national operations  
21 with regular and continuous business activity in California through a number of  
22 stores and with an advertising budget not exceeded in other jurisdictions  
23 throughout the United States.

24 12. Venue is appropriate in this District because, among other things: (a)  
25 Plaintiffs are residents of this District and citizens of this state; (b) Defendant  
26 directed its activities at residents in this District; and (c) many of the acts and  
27 omissions that give rise to this Action took place in this judicial District.  
28

1 13. Venue is further appropriate in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §  
 2 1391 because Defendant conducts a large amount of its business in this District,  
 3 and because Defendant has substantial relationships in this District.

#### 4 IV. SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS

##### 5 A. Brooks Brothers' Point-of-Sale System

6 14. Retail Brand Alliance Inc. ("RBA") purchased Brooks Brothers in  
 7 2001. Following its purchase, in 2002 RBA replaced the Retek Merchandising  
 8 Solution with JDA Portfolio(R) merchandise management software to manage  
 9 the operations of Brooks Brothers.<sup>2,3</sup> RBA emphasized the goal of having Brooks  
 10 Brothers' customers' information interconnected throughout all of its stores.  
 11 Stefano Gaggion, the vice president of Management Information System at RBA,  
 12 emphasized this goal by stating: "One Tool, One Way, One Solution . . ." which  
 13 would allow for "volumes of customer information," across stores.<sup>4</sup>

14 15. Furthermore, on July 1, 2002, Denise Albright, VP of planning and  
 15 allocation for RBA, stated, "[w]e always have data integrity and constant  
 16 reporting across the company in one common, easy to use format."<sup>5</sup> On August  
 17 1, 2003, Brooks Brothers announced going live with JDA Softwares.<sup>6</sup> Stefano  
 18 Gaggion, now Chief Information Officer ("CIO") of RBA, participated in a  
 19 technology round-table discussion on maintaining customer relationships and  
 20 RBA's choice of an all-Java enterprise application for POS:<sup>7</sup>

21 \_\_\_\_\_  
 22 <sup>2</sup> *Brooks Brothers Goes Live with JDA Software*, available at:  
 23 <https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Brooks+Brothers+Goes+Live+with+JDA+Software%3B+JDA+Portfolio+Provides...-a091383603> (attached hereto as **Exhibit A**).

24 <sup>3</sup> All cited websites were last visited on June 14, 2018.

25 <sup>4</sup> *Id.*

26 <sup>5</sup> *Retail for All Seasons*, available at: <https://risnews.com/retail-all-seasons>  
 (attached hereto as **Exhibit B**).

27 <sup>6</sup> **Ex. A.**

28 <sup>7</sup> *Retail's IT Pacesetters*, available at: <https://risnews.com/retails-it-pacesetters>  
 (attached hereto as **Exhibit C**).



1 Last year RBA selected an all-Java enterprise application  
 2 for POS from ADS Retail. Gaggion says the company will  
 3 grow its business "by utilizing multi-channels, which  
 4 integrate information between retail locations, direct  
 5 marketing and wholesale customers. Key information will  
 6 be shared via a Web-browser solution." He adds that data,  
 7 "such as demographics, product preferences and size  
 8 tendencies will be gathered about the customers and  
 9 shared with our partners, stores and wholesale customers  
 10 to drive sales and profitability.

11 16. Indeed, Brooks Brothers' utilized a Java based solution, NEXTOR I  
 12 POS, with the goal of linking all of their brand stores together as one unit.<sup>8</sup>

13 17. In 2007, Brooks Brothers switched POS systems and implemented a  
 14 Java based "clienteling" system that monitors customer behavior, including POS  
 15 data: "[t]he system records all interactions salespeople have with customers. It  
 16 reminds associates to correspond with shoppers regarding special offers, birthdays  
 17 and other information. . . [t]he product also keeps track of alterations and  
 18 customer preferences."<sup>9</sup>

19 18. Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard ("PCI") sets the  
 20 standard for security practices in relation to POS. As early as 2008, Stefano  
 21 Gaggion, SVP & CIO of Brooks Brothers, criticized the PCI compliance. He  
 22 explained that PCI compliance should be done by credit card companies, and not  
 23 retailers:<sup>10</sup>

24 The challenge is made more difficult by the lack of clear  
 25 direction and requirements. Since no one is taking  
 26 responsibility for owning PCI, each retailer struggles with

27 <sup>8</sup> *Retail Brand Alliance, Inc. Selects Nextor Point-of-Sale Application For Its*  
 28 *1,000+ Stores*, available at:

<https://www.digitalcommerce360.com/2003/01/02/retail-brand-alliance-inc-selects-nextor-point-of-sale-app/> (attached hereto as **Exhibit D**).

<sup>9</sup> *Brand Empowerment*, available at: <https://risnews.com/brand-empowerment>  
 (attached hereto as **Exhibit E**).

<sup>10</sup> *What Keeps CIOs Up At Night*, available at: <https://risnews.com/what-keeps-cios-night>  
 (attached hereto as **Exhibit F**).

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1 the challenges rather than working through a common,  
2 standard set of repeatable regulations. The lack of  
3 partnership makes the process adversarial. Since the credit  
4 card companies already have all the customer data  
5 (including authorizations) in their databases, they should  
6 own the authorization information. Then, they would be  
7 able to protect the customer and guarantee the safety of the  
8 data.

9 19. In 2009, Visa issued a Data Security Alert (which Brooks Brothers  
10 should have reasonably been aware of) outlining the threat of RAM scraper  
11 malware.<sup>11</sup> The report instructs companies to “[s]ecure remote access  
12 connectivity,” “[i]mplement a secure network configuration, including egress and  
13 ingress filtering to only allow the ports/services necessary to conduct business”  
14 (i.e., segregate networks), “actively monitor logs of network components,  
15 including IDS [intrusion detection systems] and firewalls for suspicious traffic,  
16 particularly outbound traffic to unknown addresses,” “[e]ncrypt cardholder data  
17 anywhere it is being stored and [] implement[] a data field encryption solution to  
18 directly address cardholder data in transit” and “[w]ork with your payment  
19 application vendor to ensure security controls are in place to prevent unauthorized  
20 modification to the payment application configuration.”<sup>12</sup>

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26 <sup>11</sup> *Visa Data Security Bulletin*, 2009, available at:  
27 [http://visa.com.ph/ap/sg/merchants/include/improper\\_seg\\_network.pdf](http://visa.com.ph/ap/sg/merchants/include/improper_seg_network.pdf) (attached  
28 hereto as **Exhibit G**).

<sup>12</sup> *Id.*



1           20. By March 2015, credit card companies set an October deadline for  
2           companies to switch to chip-enabled cards installed in POS systems. Brooks  
3           Brothers' CEO, Claudio Del Vecchio was displeased with paying for upgrades.<sup>13,14</sup>

4           21. All merchants that accept customer payments via payment cards,  
5           including Brooks Brothers, are and were required to comply with the Payment Card  
6           Industry Data Security Standards (the "PCI DSS").<sup>15</sup> As stated, "if you are a  
7           merchant that accepts payment cards, you are required to be compliant with the  
8           PCI [DSS]." Compliance with the PCI DSS is common practice in the retail  
9           industry. The PCI DSS, among other things, mandates merchants to protect  
10          cardholder data,<sup>16</sup> which requires merchants to install and maintain firewalls,<sup>17</sup>  
11          forbids merchants from using default settings and passwords for applications and  
12          devices,<sup>18</sup> requires merchants to segment cardholder data,<sup>19</sup> and requires merchants  
13          to identify and authenticate their system users.<sup>20</sup>

14          22. Additionally, sub-requirement 3.2 of the PCI DSS requires merchants  
15          and other organizations involved in payment card transactions to **refrain from**

16  
17  
18          <sup>13</sup> *Costly Shift To New Credit Cards Won't Fix Security Issues*, available at:  
19          [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cybersecurity-retail-insight/costly-shift-](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cybersecurity-retail-insight/costly-shift-to-new-credit-cards-wont-fix-security-issues-idUSKBN0LZ0GC20150303)  
20          [to-new-credit-cards-wont-fix-security-issues-idUSKBN0LZ0GC20150303](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cybersecurity-retail-insight/costly-shift-to-new-credit-cards-wont-fix-security-issues-idUSKBN0LZ0GC20150303)  
(attached hereto as **Exhibit H**).

21          <sup>14</sup> *Retailers face \$8.65 billion bill for new generation of credit cards*, available at:  
22          [http://fortune.com/2015/03/03/retailers-face-8-65-billion-bill-for-new-generation-](http://fortune.com/2015/03/03/retailers-face-8-65-billion-bill-for-new-generation-of-credit-cards/)  
23          [of-credit-cards/](http://fortune.com/2015/03/03/retailers-face-8-65-billion-bill-for-new-generation-of-credit-cards/) (attached hereto as **Exhibit I**).

24          <sup>15</sup> *How to Be Compliant: Getting Started with PCI Data Security Standard*  
25          *Compliance, PCI SSC*, available at  
26          [https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/merchants/how\\_to\\_be\\_compliant.php](https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/merchants/how_to_be_compliant.php)  
(attached hereto as **Exhibit J**).

27          <sup>16</sup> *Id.* at 34.

28          <sup>17</sup> *Id.* at 19.

<sup>18</sup> *Id.* at 28.

<sup>19</sup> *Id.* at 61.

<sup>20</sup> *Id.* at 64.

1 **storing sensitive authentication data after authorization** (even if it is  
2 encrypted).<sup>21</sup> To adhere to the PCI DSS, a merchant must, *inter alia*:

3 First, **Assess** -- identify cardholder data, take an inventory  
4 of your IT assets and business processes for payment card  
5 processing, and analyze them for vulnerabilities that could  
6 expose cardholder data. Second, **Remediate** -- fix  
7 vulnerabilities and do not store cardholder data unless you  
8 need it. Third, **Report** -- compile and submit required  
9 remediation validation records (if applicable), and submit  
10 compliance reports to the acquiring bank and card brands  
11 you do business with.<sup>22</sup> [emphasis on the original].

12 23. As of December 2016, Brooks Brothers was not PCI compliant. It  
13 signed a contract with SkillNet Solutions to implement the Oracle Retail Xstore  
14 POS system.<sup>23</sup> “After an intensive review of the Oracle partners in the field, we  
15 selected SkillNet’s Professional Services and Expert Services teams to support  
16 and enhance our store systems,” said Sahal Laher, EVP and CIO of Brooks  
17 Brothers.<sup>24</sup>

18 24. Around the time of the Brooks Brothers’ data breach subject to this  
19 action, Zach Paul, Brooks Brothers’ Payment and Retail Systems Analyst,  
20 “[w]orked to roll out EMV and NFC technologies to the **Verifone Pinpads.**”  
21 [emphasis added]<sup>25</sup> The Verifone Pinpads operates on Windows XP. EMV is the  
22 standard for cards equipped with computer chips and the technology used to  
23 authenticate chip-card transactions. NFC is a technology standard that essentially  
24 uses radio signals for two-way communication at very small range. Debit and

25 <sup>21</sup> *See id.* at 35.

26 <sup>22</sup> *Id.*

27 <sup>23</sup> *Brooks Brothers Selects SkillNet Solutions Retail Suite*, available at:  
28 <https://www.retailtouchpoints.com/features/news-briefs/brooks-brothers-selects-skillnet-solutions-retail-suite> (attached hereto as **Exhibit K**).

<sup>24</sup> *Id.*

<sup>25</sup> *LinkedIn of Zach Paul*, available at: <https://www.linkedin.com/in/zpaul> (attached hereto as **Exhibit L**).

1 credit cards have EMV embedded chips and antennae that enable contactless  
2 capabilities just like NFC-enabled devices.

3 **B. The Malware**

4 25. On May 10, 2018, hackers leaked a complete source code for  
5 malware affecting major retailers across the country was leaked online . The  
6 malware known as TreasureHunter (also known as TreasureHunt) was created by  
7 the Bearsinc computer crime syndicate, a dangerous criminal organization  
8 notorious for mass identity theft and credit card fraud.<sup>26</sup>

9 26. TreasureHunter malware targets retail POS systems with weak  
10 security credentials by embedding a tiny file in a large directory where the  
11 malware persistently collects data over time and transmits it to a server outside  
12 the United States.

13 27. However, upon information and belief, evidence regarding the POS  
14 malware identified as “TreasureHunter” and its potential threat to such POS  
15 systems was published by various organizations as early as March 2016. The  
16 published information describes the threat of POS malware as a type of malicious  
17 software that extracts payment card information from memory and usually  
18 uploads that data to a command and control server.<sup>27</sup> "Although the PCI DSS  
19 rules changed in October 2015, leaving retailers who have not transitioned from  
20 existing ‘swipe’ cards to EMV or ‘chip’ enabled cards liable for card present  
21 fraud in more ways than before, many retailers are still in the process of  
22 transitioning to chip-enabled card technology. Criminals appear to be racing to  
23

24 <sup>26</sup> *Author of TreasureHunter PoS Malware Releases Its Source Code*, available  
25 at: <https://www.darkreading.com/vulnerabilities---threats/author-of-treasurehunter-pos-malware-releases-its-source-code-/d/d-id/1331778> (attached  
26 hereto as **Exhibit M**).

27 <sup>27</sup> *TREASUREHUNT: A Custom POS Malware Tool*, available at:  
28 [https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/03/treasurehunt\\_a\\_cust.html](https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/03/treasurehunt_a_cust.html)  
(attached hereto as **Exhibit N**).

1 infect POS systems in the United States before US retailers complete this  
 2 transition.”

3 28. TreasureHunter attacks unpatched Windows XP based systems, and  
 4 targets POS systems not yet converted to EMV technology, including the  
 5 Verifone Pinpads utilized by Brooks Brothers.

6 29. The Bearsinc crime syndicate uses “command and control” servers  
 7 to consolidate large blocks of consumer data from compromised retailers. This is  
 8 known as a “dump shop.” The packaged data is sold in bulk on the black market  
 9 to lower tier identity theft criminals in exchange for untraceable bitcoin or other  
 10 cryptocurrencies.



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 18 30. TreasureHunter behaves like many other point-of-sale malwares.  
 19 Once an attacker has access to a Windows-based server and the POS terminal, the  
 20 malware is installed, and it establishes persistence by creating a registry key that  
 21 runs the malware at startup. It then enumerates running processes and scans  
 22 device memory looking for track data, including primary account numbers,  
 23 separators, service codes, and more. It then establishes a connection with the  
 24 attacker’s command and control server and sends the stolen data to the criminal.<sup>28</sup>

25  
 26  
 27 <sup>28</sup> *TreasureHunter Point-of-Sale Malware and Builder Source Code Leaked*,  
 28 available at: <https://www.flashpoint-intel.com/blog/treasurehunter-source-code-leaked/> (attached hereto as **Exhibit O**).

1           31. On or before 2016, the malware TreasureHunter affected Brooks  
2 Brothers' POS systems, which affected virtually all of Brooks Brothers' stores.<sup>29</sup>

3 **C. The Brooks Brothers' Data Breach Unravels**

4           32. According to the Defendant, on or about April 4, 2016, the malware  
5 was installed at POS systems at Brooks Brothers' stores. This affected 223  
6 Brooks Brothers' locations disclosed by Defendant. The malware siphoned off  
7 customers' full names, card account numbers, expiration dates, and verification  
8 codes. In addition, however, based upon information and belief, hackers were  
9 also able to acquire stores' zip codes and locations linked to purchases, and time  
10 of the transactions.

11           33. With the information acquired, additional derivative information can  
12 be obtained. When this additional and otherwise innocuous information, such as  
13 the other aforementioned disclosed data, is combined with debit/credit card  
14 information, that permits a hacker to easily commit identity theft and identity  
15 fraud.<sup>30</sup>


16           34. Until around March 1, 2017, the Malware kept acquiring customers'  
17 PII from the 223 Brooks Brothers' store locations. Defendant had previously set  
18 a website which alerted customers on which stores were affected, named  
19 "Incident locations" at [www.brooksbrothers.com/incident-locations](http://www.brooksbrothers.com/incident-locations). Defendant  
20 has now removed any notice of the data breach.

21 \_\_\_\_\_  
22 <sup>29</sup> Alternatively, the top POS malwares are the following: Nitlove PoS; PoSeidon;  
23 MalumPOS; CherryPicker; AbaddonPOS. Available at: [https://duo.com/blog/a-  
24 breakdown-of-different-types-of-point-of-sale-malware](https://duo.com/blog/a-breakdown-of-different-types-of-point-of-sale-malware) (attached hereto as  
**Exhibit P**).

25 <sup>30</sup> Hackers are easily able to acquire additional information such as date of birth,  
26 current and past addresses, phone numbers, e-mail addresses, driving records,  
27 criminal records, and possible relatives, with a simple public record search that  
28 requires not more than an individual's full name. *See New Website Exposes  
Driving Histories*, available at: [http://www.wnd.com/2018/06/new-website-  
exposes-driving-histories/](http://www.wnd.com/2018/06/new-website-exposes-driving-histories/) (attached hereto as **Exhibit Q**).

1 35. It was not until May 12, 2017, over thirteen (13) months after the  
 2 data breach began, Brooks Brothers disclosed this breach on its website.<sup>31,32</sup> On  
 3 May 12, 2017, Brooks Brothers admitted that the security breach included “name,  
 4 payment card account number, card expiration date, and card verification code.”  
 5 *Id.* In addition, however, based upon information and belief, hackers were also  
 6 able to acquire store zip code and location linked to purchases, and time of the  
 7 transactions, and potentially much more.<sup>33</sup>

8 36. However, this disclosure was not prominently placed on Brooks  
 9 Brothers’ website. Rather, Brooks Brothers inserted a small tab in the bottom left  
 10 corner of the webpage titled “Data Incident.” This small tab that then would link  
 11 the visitor to a separate page, which was only visible if the viewer scrolls to the  
 12 very end of the webpage. This disclosure is no longer shown on its website:



13  
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16  
17  
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19  
20 [This portion of the page has intentionally been left blank]

21  
22  
23 <sup>31</sup> *Brooks Brothers Incident Message*, available at:

24 <http://www.brooksbrothers.com/data-incident/incident,default,pg.html> (attached  
 25 hereto as **Exhibit R**).

26 <sup>32</sup> *Brooks Brothers Breach Advisory statement*, available at:

27 [https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/Sample%20Notice\\_9.pdf](https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/Sample%20Notice_9.pdf)? (attached hereto as  
 28 **Exhibit S**).

29 <sup>33</sup> "[Data] such as demographics, product preferences and size tendencies will be  
 gathered about the customers and shared with our partners, stores and wholesale  
 customers to drive sales and profitability." **Ex. C**.



1 37. The old notice on the website appeared at the very bottom of the  
 2 webpage as shown below:<sup>34</sup>



3  
 4  
 5  
 6  
 7  
 8 38. As noted by Brooks Brothers’ own privacy policy in effect during  
 9 the time of the data breach, Brooks Brothers collected customers’ information  
 10 and customers’ behavior for its own benefit:<sup>35</sup>

11 **Information Collected**

12 Brooks Brothers values its customers and respects their privacy. We collect customer information in an effort to improve your shopping experience and to communicate with you about our products, services, contests, and promotions. Brooks Brothers recognizes that it must maintain and use customer information responsibly.

13 We collect information (such as your name, email address, mailing address, and phone and credit card numbers) that you provide when you place an order, join our mailing list, register with us or participate in a contest, promotion or survey. We also maintain a record of your product interests and your purchases online and in our stores.

14 To serve you better, the information you supply to us is added to our customer database. We will add you to our mailing list. From time to time, you may receive periodic mailings or emails from us about new products and services, discounts, special promotions or upcoming events. If you do not want to receive such emails or mailings from us, please contact us via email, phone, fax or mail (our numbers and addresses are listed [below](#)). You may unsubscribe from our email list directly on the website. Telephone numbers are only used to contact you regarding an order placed with Brooks Brothers. They are not used for any promotional purpose(s).

15 We may combine information you give us online and in our stores as well as information about your product interests and purchases. In addition, we may combine information you provide with demographic information that is publicly available. We use this combined information to enhance and personalize your shopping experience with us, and to communicate with you by email or postal mail about our products, services, contests and promotions that may be of interest to you.

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 21 *[This portion of the page has intentionally been left blank]*

22  
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 25  
 26 <sup>34</sup> Brooks Brothers’ website from May 15, 2017; Brooks Brothers’ Website from  
 27 June 18, 2018 (attached hereto as **Exhibit T**).

28 <sup>35</sup> Brooks Brothers’ Privacy Policy from February 20, 2017 (attached hereto as **Exhibit U**).



1 39. Today, Brooks Brothers makes it even more clear that the collection  
2 of customer information is conducted in an effort to maximize their marketing  
3 and “shopping experience,” as noted below:<sup>36</sup>

4 Information Collected

5 We collect customer information in an effort to improve your shopping experience and to communicate with you about our products, services, contests, and  
6 promotions. Brooks Brothers recognizes that it must maintain and use customer information responsibly.

7 We collect information (such as your name, email address, mailing address, and phone and credit card numbers) that you provide when you place an order, join  
8 our mailing list, register with us or participate in a contest, promotion or survey. We also maintain a record of your product interests and your purchases online  
9 and in our stores.

10 To serve you better, the information you supply to us is added to our customer database. This information is used to communicate with you about new products  
11 and services, discounts, special promotions or upcoming events. To modify your communication preferences, please contact us via any of the methods listed  
12 below.

13 Please note that telephone numbers are only used to contact you regarding an order placed with us. They are not used for any promotional purpose(s).

14 We may combine information you give us online and in our stores as well as information about your product interests and purchases. In addition, we may  
15 combine information you provide with demographic information that is publicly available. We use this combined information to enhance and personalize your  
16 shopping experience with us, and to communicate with you by email or postal mail about our products, services, contests and promotions that may be of interest  
17 to you.

18 40. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has issued numerous  
19 guides for businesses, highlighting the importance of reasonable data security  
20 practices. According to the FTC, the need for data security should be factored  
21 into all business decision-making.<sup>37</sup>

22 41. In 2016, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) updated its  
23 publication, *Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business*, which  
24 establishes guidelines for fundamental data security principles and practices for  
25 businesses. The guidelines note businesses should protect the personal customer  
26 information that they keep; properly dispose of personal information that is no  
27 longer needed; encrypt information stored on computer networks; understand  
28 their network’s vulnerabilities; and implement policies to correct security  
29 problems. The guidelines also recommend that businesses use an intrusion

30 \_\_\_\_\_  
31 <sup>36</sup> *Brooks Brothers’ Current Privacy Policy* (attached hereto as **Exhibit V**).

32 <sup>37</sup> *Start With Security*, available at:  
33 [https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf0205-  
34 startwithsecurity.pdf](https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf0205-startwithsecurity.pdf) (attached hereto as **Exhibit W**).

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1 detection system to expose a breach as soon as it occurs; monitor all incoming  
2 traffic for activity indicating someone is attempting to hack the system; watch for  
3 large amounts of data being transmitted from the system; and have a response  
4 plan ready in the event of a breach.

5 42. The FTC recommends that companies do not maintain cardholder  
6 information longer than is needed for authorization of a transaction; limit access  
7 to sensitive data; require complex passwords to be used on networks; use  
8 industry-tested methods for security; monitor for suspicious activity on the  
9 network; and verify that third-party service providers have implemented  
10 reasonable security measures. network; and verify that third-party service  
11 providers have implemented reasonable security measures.<sup>38</sup>

12 43. The FTC has brought enforcement actions against businesses for  
13 failing to adequately and reasonably protect customer data, treating the failure to  
14 employ reasonable and appropriate measures to protect against unauthorized  
15 access to confidential consumer data as an unfair act or practice prohibited by  
16 Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”), 15 U.S.C. § 45.  
17 Orders resulting from these actions further clarify the measures businesses must  
18 take to meet their data security obligations.

19 44. In this case, Defendant was at all times fully aware of its obligation  
20 to protect the PII of its customers because of its participation in payment card  
21 processing networks. Defendant was also aware of the significant repercussions  
22 if it failed to do so because it collected payment card data from thousands of  
23 customers daily at its stores; Defendant knew that this data, if hacked, would  
24 result in injury to consumers, including Plaintiffs and Class members.  
25  
26  
27

---

28 <sup>38</sup> *Id.*

1 45. Defendant’s apparent knowledge of its duty of keeping information  
2 private is shown and supported by Defendant’s Privacy Policy in effect during  
3 the time of the breach.<sup>39</sup>

4 **Privacy**

We respect your privacy and, therefore, Brooks Brothers does not sell or rent the personal information you provide to us to any third party you do not wish us to do so. Upon your request, we will not share your personal information with any unaffiliated third party. We may make our mailing list available to carefully screened companies whose products and services might interest you. If you do not wish to receive such mailings, or for us to share your information with any third parties as described above, please contact us via email, phone, fax or mail (below). Include your name and address as it was supplied to us, and indicate "Do Not Share".

6 Brooks Brothers may share information with its subsidiaries and other affiliated companies, and with other carefully selected vendors and business partners with whom we work. This includes companies that perform fraud prevention/detection services; assist us in providing our products and services to you; assist in maintaining and managing customer information to provide customer and internet services; take and fulfill orders; conduct Brooks Brothers promotions and surveys; or assist us in more effectively communicating with our customers. All companies that act on our behalf are contractually obligated to keep all information confidential and to use the customer information only to provide the services we ask them to perform for you and us. We may provide aggregate statistics about our customers, sales, traffic patterns and related site information to reputable third party vendors. We may disclose Personal Information we collect from you if required to do so by law or in the good-faith belief that disclosure is necessary (a) to obey the law or comply with legal process served on us or our affiliates; (b) to protect and defend our rights or property or the rights or property of other users of our Site; or (c) to act in an emergency to protect the personal safety of users of our Site or the public. . If you register with us to receive promotional emails or postal mailings, you agree that Brooks Brothers may transfer your information to its international Brooks Brothers affiliates who may send you communications directly, depending on your location.

11 Additionally we may disclose your personal information to the buyer as a result of the sale of stock or substantially all of the assets of Brooks Brothers, whether by merger, acquisition, or similar or related transactions or in the event of a liquidation of the assets of the company.

12 **D. Stolen Information Is Valuable to Hackers and Thieves**

13 46. It is well known, and the subject of many media reports, that  
14 payment card data is highly coveted and a frequent target of hackers. Especially  
15 in the technology industry, the issue of data security and threats thereto is well  
16 known. Despite well-publicized litigation and frequent public announcements of  
17 data breaches by retailers, Brooks Brothers opted to maintain an insufficient and  
18 inadequate system to protect the PII of Plaintiffs and Class Members.

19 47. Legitimate organizations and the criminal underground recognize  
20 the value of payment information. Otherwise, they would not aggressively seek  
21 or pay for it.

22 48. Credit or debit card information is highly valuable to hackers.  
23 Credit and debit card information that is stolen from the POS is known as  
24 “dumps.”<sup>40</sup> Credit and debit card dumps can be sold in the cybercrime

26 <sup>39</sup> **Ex. U.**

27 <sup>40</sup> *Krebs on Security April 16, 2016, Blog Post*, available at:  
28 <https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/04/all-about-fraud-how-crooks-get-the-cv>  
(attached hereto as **Exhibit X**).

1 underground for a retail value of about “\$20 apiece.” *Id.* Furthermore, this  
2 information can also be used to clone a debit or credit card. *Id.*

3 49. Identity thieves use stolen PII for a variety of crimes, including  
4 credit card fraud, phone or utilities fraud, and bank/finance fraud. The FTC  
5 defines identity theft as “a fraud committed or attempted using the identifying  
6 information of another person without authority.” 16 C.F.R. § 603.2. The FTC  
7 describes “identifying information” as “any name or number that may be used,  
8 alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific person,”  
9 including, among other things, “[n]ame, social security number, date of birth,  
10 official State or government issued driver’s license or identification number,  
11 alien registration number, government passport number, employer or taxpayer  
12 identification number.” *Id.*

13 **E. The Data Breach Has and Will Result in Additional Identity Theft and**  
14 **Identity Fraud**

15 50. Brooks Brothers failed to implement and maintain reasonable  
16 security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature and scope of the  
17 information compromised in the data breach.

18 51. The ramifications of failing to keep Plaintiffs and Class Members’  
19 data secure are severe.

20 52. Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ information accessed in the Brooks  
21 Brothers’ breach can be used to commit further identity theft by placing Plaintiffs  
22 and Class Members at a higher risk of phishing and pharming where hackers  
23 exploit information they already obtained to get even more PII.

24 53. Congress has treated credit card numbers as sufficiently sensitive to  
25 warrant legislation prohibiting merchants from printing such numbers on  
26 receipts—specifically to reduce the risk of identity theft. *See* 15 U.S.C. §  
27 1681c(g) (2012).  
28

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1           54. Defendant acknowledges that the stolen information gave hackers  
2 the means to commit fraud or identity theft, as Defendant recommended: “we  
3 recommend that customers review credit and debit card account statements as  
4 soon as possible in order to determine if there are any discrepancies or unusual  
5 activity listed. **We urge customers to remain vigilant and continue to monitor**  
6 **statements for unusual activity going forward.**”<sup>41</sup>

7           55. A person whose PII has been obtained and compromised may not  
8 see the full extent of identity theft or fraud for years. It may take some time for  
9 the victim to become aware of the theft. In addition, a victim may not become  
10 aware of charges when they are nominal, as typical fraud-prevention algorithms  
11 may not capture such charges. Those charges may be repeated, over and over  
12 again on a victim’s account.

13           56. "Phishing" is a form of online identity theft that lures consumers into  
14 divulging their personal financial information to fraudulent websites, also known  
15 as spoofed websites. For example, a phisher sends an email message to an  
16 unsuspecting victim instructing him or her to click on the link to a bank's website  
17 (provided in the email) to confirm the consumer's account information.  
18 Unbeknownst to the consumer, the website is a convincing fake or copy of the  
19 authentic website. The unsuspecting consumer takes the bait and provides the  
20 information, thereby enabling the phisher to steal the consumer's personal  
21 financial information. The phisher can then use the stolen information to clean  
22 out the victim's bank accounts or commit other forms of identity theft.

23           57. "Pharming" is similar to phishing, albeit more sophisticated.  
24 Pharmers also send emails. A consumer compromises his or her personal  
25 financial information simply by opening a pharmer's email. The pharming email  
26 contains a virus (or Trojan horse) that installs a small software program on a  
27

28 <sup>41</sup> **Ex. S.**



1 consumer's computer. When the consumer attempts to visit an official website,  
 2 the pharmer's software program redirects the browser to the pharmer's fake  
 3 version of the website. In this way, the pharmer is able to capture the PII the  
 4 consumer enters into the counterfeit website, thereby compromising the  
 5 consumer's account.

6 58. According to Javelin Strategy and Research, "one in every three  
 7 people who is notified of being a potential fraud victim becomes one . . . with  
 8 46% of consumers who had cards breached becoming fraud victims that same  
 9 year."<sup>42</sup>

10 59. Simply reimbursing a consumer for a financial loss due to fraud does  
 11 not make that individual whole again. The Department of Justice's Bureau of  
 12 Justice Statistics ("BJS") found that "among victims who had personal  
 13 information used for fraudulent purposes, 32% spent a month or more resolving  
 14 problems."<sup>43</sup> In fact, the BJS reported, "resolving the problems caused by  
 15 identity theft may take more than a year for some victims." *Id.* at 13.

16 60. According to the U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice  
 17 Statistics, an estimated 17.6 million people were victims of one or more incidents  
 18 of identity theft in 2014. Among identity theft victims, existing bank or credit  
 19 card accounts were the most common types of misused information. *Id.*

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24 <sup>42</sup> *Someone Became an Identity Theft Victim Every 2 Seconds Last Year*, Fox  
 25 Business, Feb. 5, 2014 available at: <http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2014/02/05/someone-became-identitytheft-victim-every-2-seconds-last-year.html> (attached hereto as **Exhibit Y**).

26  
 27 <sup>43</sup> *Victims of Identity Theft*, U.S. Department of Justice, September 2015,  
 28 available at: <https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit14.pdf> (attached hereto as **Exhibit Z**).

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1           61. Similarly, the FTC cautions that identity theft wreaks havoc on  
2 consumers’ finances, credit history, and reputation and can take time, money, and  
3 patience to resolve.<sup>44</sup>

4 **F. Annual Monetary Losses from Identity Theft are in the Billions of**  
5 **Dollars**

6           62. Javelin Strategy and Research reports that monetary losses from  
7 identity theft increased to \$21 billion in 2013.<sup>45</sup> There may be a time lag between  
8 when harm occurs and when it is discovered, and also between when PII is stolen  
9 and when it is used. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office  
10 (“GAO”), which conducted a study regarding data breaches:

11                           [L]aw enforcement officials told us that in some cases,  
12 stolen data may be held for up to a year or more before  
13 being used to commit identity theft. Further, once stolen  
14 data have been sold or posted on the Web, fraudulent use  
15 of that information may continue for years. As a result,  
16 studies that attempt to measure the harm resulting from  
data breaches cannot necessarily rule out all future harm.<sup>46</sup>

17           63. Plaintiffs and Class Members now face years of constant  
18 surveillance of their financial and personal records, monitoring, and loss of  
19 rights. Plaintiffs and Class Members are incurring and will continue to incur  
20 such damages in addition to any fraudulent credit and debit card charges incurred  
21 by them, and the resulting loss of use of their credit and access to funds, whether  
22 or not such charges are ultimately reimbursed by the credit card companies.  
23  
24

25 <sup>44</sup> See *Taking Charge, What to Do If Your Identity is Stolen*, FTC, at 3 (2012),  
26 available at: <http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/pdf-0009-taking-charge.pdf>  
(attached hereto as **Exhibit AA**).

27 <sup>45</sup> *2013 Identity Fraud Report* (attached hereto as **Exhibit AB**)

28 <sup>46</sup> GAO, *Report to Congressional Requesters*, at 33 (June 2007), available at  
<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07737.pdf> (attached hereto as **Exhibit AC**).



1           64. The National Institute of Standards and Technology categorizes the  
2 combination of names and credit card numbers as sensitive and warranting a  
3 higher impact level based on the potential harm when used in contexts other than  
4 their intended use.<sup>47</sup> Private information that is “linked” or “linkable” is also  
5 more sensitive. Linked information is information about or related to an  
6 individual that is logically associated with other information about the individual.  
7 Linkable information is information about or related to an individual for which  
8 there is a possibility of logical association with other information about the  
9 individual. An example of linking information the NIST report cites is a  
10 Massachusetts Institute of Technology study showing that 97% of the names and  
11 addresses on a voting list were identifiable using only ZIP code and date of birth.

12           65. Private information is broader in scope than directly identifiable  
13 information. As technology advances, computer programs become increasingly  
14 able to scan the Internet with wider scopes to create a mosaic of information that  
15 may be used to link information to an individual in ways that were not previously  
16 possible.

17 **G. Plaintiffs and Class Members Suffered Damages**

18           66. The data breach was a direct and proximate result of Brooks  
19 Brothers’ failure to properly safeguard and protect Plaintiff’s and Class  
20 Members’ Private Identifiable Information from unauthorized access, use, and  
21 disclosure, as required by various state and federal regulations, industry practices,  
22 and the common law, including Brooks Brothers’ failure to establish and  
23 implement appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to  
24 ensure the security and confidentiality of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private

25 \_\_\_\_\_  
26 <sup>47</sup> *Guide to Protecting the Confidentiality of Personally Identifiable Information*  
27 (*PII*), National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-  
28 [http://ws680.nist.gov/publication/get\\_pdf.cfm?pub\\_id=904990](http://ws680.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=904990) (attached hereto  
as **Exhibit AD**).

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1 Identifiable Information to protect against reasonably foreseeable threats to the  
2 security or integrity of such information.

3 67. Brooks Brothers’ itself admits to their shortcomings when it comes  
4 to security, as noted in their “Message to Our Customers About Payment Card  
5 Security Incident,” Brooks Brothers’ goes on to state, “[while] we are continuing  
6 to review and enhance our security measures moving forward to help prevent a  
7 future incident. Again, please accept our sincere regret for any concern that this  
8 incident may cause.”<sup>48</sup>

9 68. Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ PII is private and sensitive in nature,  
10 and it was inadequately protected by Brooks Brothers. Brooks Brothers did not  
11 obtain Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ consent to disclose their PII except to  
12 certain persons not relevant to this action, as required by applicable law and  
13 industry standards.

14 69. As a direct and proximate result of Brooks Brothers’ wrongful  
15 action and inaction and the resulting data breach, Plaintiffs and Class Members  
16 have been placed at an imminent, immediate, and continuing increased risk of  
17 harm from identity theft and identity fraud, requiring them to take the time and  
18 effort to mitigate the actual and potential impact of the subject data breach on  
19 their lives by, among other things, placing “freezes” and “alerts” with credit  
20 reporting agencies, contacting their financial institutions, closing or modifying  
21 financial accounts, and closely reviewing and monitoring their credit reports and  
22 accounts for unauthorized activity.

23 70. Brooks Brothers’ wrongful action and inactions directly and  
24 proximately caused the theft and dissemination into the public domain of  
25 Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII, causing them to suffer, and continue to  
26

27 \_\_\_\_\_  
28 <sup>48</sup> *Message to Our Customers About Payment Card Security Incident* (attached  
hereto as **Exhibit AE**).

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1 suffer, economic damages and other actual harm for which they are entitled to  
2 compensation, including:

- 3 a. Theft of their PII;
  - 4 b. The imminent and certainly impending injury flowing from potential  
5 fraud and identity theft posed by their PII being placed in the hands  
6 of criminals and already misused via the sale of Plaintiffs' and Class  
7 Members' information on the Internet black market;
  - 8 c. The untimely and inadequate notification of the data breach;
  - 9 d. The improper disclosure of their PII;
  - 10 e. Loss of privacy;
  - 11 f. Ascertainable losses in the form of out-of-pocket expenses and the  
12 value of their time reasonably incurred to remedy or mitigate the  
13 effects of the data breach;
  - 14 g. Ascertainable losses in the form of deprivation of the value of their  
15 PII, for which there is a well-established national and international  
16 market;
  - 17 h. Overpayments to Defendant for purchases during the period of the  
18 subject data breach in that implied in the price paid for such product  
19 by Plaintiffs and the Class Members to Defendant was the promise  
20 that some amount of the product charge would be applied to the costs  
21 of implementing reasonable and adequate safeguards and security  
22 measures that would protect customers' PII, which Defendant and its  
23 affiliates did not implement and, as a result, Plaintiffs and Class  
24 Members did not receive what they paid for and were overcharged by  
25 Defendant; and
  - 26 i. Deprivation of rights they possess under the Unfair Competition  
27 Laws.
- 28

1 **V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS**

2 71. Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and pursuant to the  
3 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a), (b)(2), (b)(3), and (c)(4), Plaintiffs  
4 seek certification of a Nationwide class and a California class. The nationwide  
5 class is initially defined as follows:

6 All persons residing in the United States who made purchases  
7 at Defendant’s stores from the time period of April 14, 2016,  
8 and March 1, 2017 (the “Nationwide Class”).

9 The California class is initially defined as follows:

10 All persons residing in California who made purchases at  
11 Defendant’s stores from the time period of April 14, 2016,  
12 and March 1, 2017 (the “California Class”).

13 72. Excluded from each of the above Classes are Brooks Brothers,  
14 including any entity in which Brooks Brothers has a controlling interest, is a  
15 parent or subsidiary, or which is controlled by Brooks Brothers, as well as the  
16 officers, directors, affiliates, legal representatives, heirs, predecessors, successors,  
17 and assigns of Brooks Brothers. Also excluded are the judges and court  
18 personnel in this case and any members of their immediate families. Plaintiffs  
19 reserve the right to amend the Class definitions if discovery and further  
20 investigation reveal that the Class should be expanded or otherwise modified.

21 73. *Numerosity*. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). The members of the Classes  
22 are so numerous that the joinder of all members is impractical. While the exact  
23 number of Class Members is unknown to Plaintiffs at this time, Brooks Brothers  
24 has acknowledged that customers’ Private Identifiable Information was siphoned  
25 for a period of almost a year in 223 Brooks Brothers stores. The disposition of  
26 the claims of Class Members in a single action will provide substantial benefits to  
27 all parties and to the Court. The Class Members are readily identifiable from  
28 information and records in Defendant’s possession, custody, or control.

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1           74. *Commonality*. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) and (b)(3). There are  
2 questions of law and fact common to the Classes, which predominate over any  
3 questions affecting only individual Class Members. These common questions of  
4 law and fact include, without limitation:

- 5           a. Whether Defendant owed a duty of care to Plaintiffs and Class  
6           Members with respect to the security of their personal information;
- 7           b. Whether Defendant took reasonable steps and measures to safeguard  
8           Plaintiffs' and Class Members' personal information;
- 9           c. Whether Defendant violated California's Unfair Competition Law  
10           by failing to implement reasonable security procedures and  
11           practices;
- 12           d. Whether Defendant violated common and statutory law by failing to  
13           promptly notify Class Members that their PII had been  
14           compromised;
- 15           e. Which security procedures and which data-breach notification  
16           procedure should Defendant be required to implement as part of any  
17           injunctive relief ordered by the Court;
- 18           f. Whether Defendant has an implied contractual obligation to use  
19           reasonable security measures;
- 20           g. Whether Defendant has complied with any implied contractual  
21           obligation to use reasonable security measures;
- 22           h. Whether Defendant's acts and omissions described herein give rise  
23           to a claim of negligence;
- 24           i. Whether Defendant knew or should have known of the security  
25           breach prior to its 2017 disclosure;
- 26           j. Whether Defendant had a duty to promptly notify Plaintiffs and  
27           Class Members that their personal information was, or potentially  
28           could be, compromised;

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1 k. What security measures, if any, must be implemented by Defendant  
2 to comply with its implied contractual obligations;

3 l. The nature of the relief, including equitable relief, to  
4 which Plaintiffs and the Class Members are entitled;

5 m. Whether Defendant willfully and/or negligently violated the Fair  
6 Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, *et seq.*; and

7 n. Whether Plaintiffs and the Class Members are entitled to damages,  
8 civil penalties, punitive damages, and/or injunctive relief.

9 75. *Typicality.* Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Plaintiffs' claims are typical of  
10 those of other Class Members because Plaintiffs' PII, like that of every other  
11 Class Member, was misused and/or disclosed by Brooks Brothers.

12 76. *Adequacy of Representation.* Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Plaintiffs  
13 will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of  
14 the Classes. Plaintiffs have retained competent counsel experienced in litigation  
15 of class actions, including consumer and data breach class actions, and Plaintiffs  
16 intend to prosecute this action vigorously. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the  
17 claims of other members of the Classes and Plaintiffs have the same non-  
18 conflicting interests as the other Class Members. Therefore, the interests of the  
19 Classes will be fairly and adequately represented by Plaintiffs and their counsel.

20 77. *Superiority of Class Action.* Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). A class action  
21 is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of  
22 this controversy since joinder of all the members of the Classes is impracticable.  
23 Furthermore, the adjudication of this controversy through a class action will  
24 avoid the possibility of inconsistent and potentially conflicting adjudication of the  
25 asserted claims. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a  
26 class action.

27 78. Damages for any individual class member are likely insufficient to  
28 justify the cost of individual litigation so that, in the absence of class treatment,

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1 Brooks Brothers’ violations of law inflicting substantial damages in the aggregate  
2 would go un-remedied.

3 79. Class certification is also appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and  
4 (b)(2), because Brooks Brothers has acted or has refused to act on grounds  
5 generally applicable to the Classes, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding  
6 declaratory relief is appropriate as to the Classes as a whole.

7 **VI. CAUSES OF ACTION**

8 **COUNT I**

9 **Breach of Implied Contract**

10 (On Behalf of Plaintiffs, the Nationwide Class and the California Class)

11 80. Plaintiffs allege and incorporates herein by reference each and every  
12 allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 79, inclusive, of this Complaint as if  
13 set forth fully herein.

14 81. Brooks Brothers solicited and invited Plaintiffs and the members of  
15 the Class to buy its retail merchandise. Plaintiffs and Class Members accepted  
16 Brooks Brothers’ offers and bought Brooks Brothers’ retail merchandise.  
17 Implied in Brooks Brothers’ offer to sell merchandise was the promise that  
18 Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ PII would not be harvested by a hacker at the  
19 moment of acceptance.

20 82. When Plaintiffs and Class Members purchased Brooks Brothers’  
21 merchandise, they provided their PII. In so doing, Plaintiffs and Class Members  
22 entered into implied contracts with Brooks Brothers where Brooks Brothers  
23 agreed to safeguard and protect such information, dispose, and to timely and  
24 accurately notify Plaintiffs and Class Members if their data had been breached  
25 and compromised.

26 83. As noted by Brooks Brothers’ itself, “Brooks Brothers values its  
27 customers and respects their privacy. We collect customer information in an  
28 effort to improve your shopping experience and to communicate with you about



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1 our products, services, contests, and promotions. Brooks Brothers recognizes that  
2 it must maintain and use customer information responsibly.”<sup>49</sup>

3 84. Each purchase of Brooks Brothers’ retail merchandise by Plaintiffs  
4 and Class Members was made pursuant to the mutually agreed-upon implied  
5 contract with Brooks Brothers under which Brooks Brothers agreed to safeguard  
6 and protect Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII and to timely and accurately  
7 notify them if such information was compromised or stolen. As stated by  
8 Brooks Brothers, “We respect your privacy and, therefore, Brooks Brothers does  
9 not sell or rent the personal information you provide to us to any third party you  
10 do not wish us to do so.”<sup>50</sup>

11 85. Plaintiffs and Class Members would not have provided and entrusted  
12 their PII to Defendant in the absence of the implied contract. As noted by Brooks  
13 Brothers’ CEO, “[o]ur major asset is our brand . . . [w]e want high expectation  
14 customers.”<sup>51</sup>

15 86. Plaintiffs and Class Members fully performed their obligations under  
16 the implied contracts with Defendant.

17 87. Defendant breached the implied contracts which it made with  
18 Plaintiffs and Class Members by failing to safeguard and protect the PII of  
19 Plaintiffs and Class Members and by failing to provide timely and accurate notice  
20 to them that their PII was compromised as a result of the data breach.

21 88. Plaintiffs and Class Members have lost the benefit of the bargain by  
22 having their PII compromised. Plaintiffs and Class Members have spent more on  
23 purchasing Defendant’s merchandise than they would have if they had known that  
24 Defendant was not providing the reasonable security that Plaintiffs and Class  
25

26  
27 <sup>49</sup> Ex. U.

28 <sup>50</sup> Id.

<sup>51</sup> Ex. E.

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1 Members expected. Plaintiffs and Class Members have lost money and/or property  
2 as a result of Defendant’s actions.

3 89. Defendant failed to prevent the data breach, which makes Plaintiffs’  
4 and Class Members’ harm “fairly traceable” to conduct being challenged here.<sup>52</sup>

5 90. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s breaches of the  
6 implied contracts between Defendant and Plaintiffs and Class Members, Plaintiffs  
7 and Class Members sustained actual losses and damages in an amount according  
8 to proof at trial but in excess of the minimum jurisdictional requirement of this  
9 Court.

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16 <sup>52</sup> As explained by judge Michelle Friedland in *In re Zappos.com, Inc.*, 888 F.3d  
17 1020 (9th Cir. 2018):

18 That hackers might have stolen Plaintiffs’ PII in unrelated breaches,  
19 and that Plaintiffs might suffer identity theft or fraud caused by the  
20 data stolen in those other breaches (rather than the data stolen from  
21 Zappos), is less about standing and more about the merits of  
22 causation and damages. As the Seventh Circuit recognized in  
23 *Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC*, 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir.  
24 2015), that “some other store might [also] have caused the plaintiffs’  
25 private information to be exposed does nothing to negate the  
26 plaintiffs’ standing to sue” for the breach in question.<sup>13</sup> *Id.* at 696;  
27 cf. *Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins*, 490 U.S. 228, 263 (1989)  
28 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[I]n multiple causation  
cases, . . . the common law of torts has long shifted the burden of  
proof to multiple defendants to prove that their negligent actions  
were not the ‘but-for’ cause of the plaintiff’s injury.” (citing  
*Summers v. Tice*, 199 P.2d 1, 3–4 (Cal. 1948))), superseded on other  
grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).

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1 **COUNT II**

2 **Negligence**

3 (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Nationwide and California Classes)

4 91. Plaintiffs alleges and incorporates herein by reference each and every  
5 allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 90, inclusive, of this Complaint as if  
6 set forth fully herein.

7 92. Upon accepting Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ PII in their  
8 respective POS systems, Brooks Brothers undertook and owed a duty to Plaintiffs  
9 and Class Members to exercise reasonable care to secure and safeguard that  
10 information from being compromised, lost, stolen, misused, and or/disclosed to  
11 unauthorized parties, and to utilize commercially reasonable methods to do so.  
12 This duty included, among other things, designing, maintaining, and testing  
13 Brooks Brothers security systems to ensure that Plaintiffs' and the Class  
14 Members' PII was adequately secured and protected.

15 93. Defendant further had a duty to implement processes that would  
16 detect a breach of its security system in a timely manner.

17 94. Defendant breached a legal duty independent of any contractual  
18 obligation it had to the Plaintiffs and Class Members.

19 95. Defendant had a duty to Plaintiffs and the Class Members to  
20 implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices to safeguard  
21 Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII as required by California Civil Code  
22 §1798.81.5 and Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. §45). This legal duty  
23 arises outside of any contractual, implied or express, responsibilities that  
24 Defendant had between Plaintiffs and Class Members, as it is “completely  
25 independent” of any contract. *Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp.*, 34  
26 Cal.4th 979 (2004).

27 96. Moreover, had Plaintiffs and Class Members known of Defendant’s  
28 improper security systems, they would not have entered into an agreement in the

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1 first place, and thus, would not have suffered from Defendant’s breach of contract  
2 itself.

3 97. Negligence *per se* creates a presumption that affects a cause of action  
4 for negligence. Under the doctrine, “the plaintiff ‘borrows’ statutes to prove duty  
5 of care and standard of care.” *Johnson v. Honeywell Internat. Inc.*, 179  
6 Cal.App.4th 549 (2009); Evidence Code § 669.

7 98. Pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. §45),  
8 Defendant had a duty to provide fair and adequate computer systems and data  
9 security practices to safeguard Plaintiffs’ and the Class Members’ PII.

10 99. Defendant breached its duties to Plaintiffs and the Class Members  
11 under the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45).

12 100. Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits “unfair . . . practices in or affecting  
13 commerce,” including, as interpreted and enforced by the FTC, the unfair act or  
14 practice by businesses, such as Defendant, of failing to use reasonable measures to  
15 protect Private Information. The FTC publications and orders described above also  
16 form part of the basis of Defendant’s duty in this regard.

17 101. Defendant violated Section 5 of the FTC Act by failing to use  
18 reasonable measures to protect Private Information and not complying with  
19 applicable industry standards, as described herein. Defendant’s conduct was  
20 particularly unreasonable given the nature and amount of PII in its stores obtained  
21 and stored, and the foreseeable consequences of a data breach at a retail chain as  
22 large as Defendant’s, including, specifically, the damages that would result to  
23 Plaintiffs and Class members.

24 102. Defendant’s violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act constitutes  
25 negligence *per se*.

26 103. Plaintiffs and Class Members are within the class of persons that the  
27 FTC Act was intended to protect.  
28

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1           104. The harm that occurred as a result of the security breach is the type of  
2 harm the FTC Act was intended to guard against. The FTC has pursued  
3 enforcement actions against businesses, which, as a result of their failure to employ  
4 reasonable data security measures and avoid unfair and deceptive practices, caused  
5 the same harm as that suffered by Plaintiffs and Class Members.

6           105. Defendant also breached its duties to Plaintiffs and Class Members  
7 under California Civil Code §1798.81.5 by failing to provide fair, reasonable, or  
8 adequate computer systems and data security practices to safeguard Plaintiff’s and  
9 the Class Members’ PII. “A business that . . . maintains personal information  
10 about a California resident shall implement and maintain reasonable security  
11 procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information, to protect the  
12 personal information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or  
13 disclosure.” California Civil Code §1798.81.5 (b) [emphasis added].

14           106. Plaintiffs and Class members are within the class of persons that  
15 California Civil §1798.81 is meant to protect. “It is the intent of the Legislature to  
16 ensure that personal information about California residents is protected.”  
17 California Civil Code §1798.81.5 (a)(1).

18           107. Defendant’s failure to comply with applicable laws and regulations  
19 constitutes negligence *per se*, which creates a presumption of negligence. *Das v.*  
20 *Bank of Am., N.A.*, 186 Cal. App. 4th 727, 737 (2010).

21           108. But for Defendant’s negligence *per se*, Plaintiffs and the Class  
22 Members would not have been harmed.

23           109. The injury and harm suffered by Plaintiffs and the Class Members  
24 was the reasonably foreseeable result of Defendant’s negligence *per se*.

25           110. Defendant knew or should have known that its negligence *per se*  
26 would cause Plaintiffs and the Class Members to experience the foreseeable harms  
27 associated with the exposure of their PII.  
28

1           111. A “special relationship” exists between Defendant and the Plaintiffs  
2 and Class Members. Defendant entered into a “special relationship” with the  
3 Plaintiffs and Class Members whose PII was solicited, requested, collected - with  
4 every purchase - and received by Defendant. Defendant entered into a “special  
5 relationship” with all Plaintiffs and Class Members by placing their PII in their  
6 database, sharing with its affiliates, and using this information to target specific  
7 marketing efforts to Plaintiffs and Class Members, as noted by Defendant, “We  
8 collect customer information in an effort to improve your shopping experience and  
9 to communicate with you about our products, services, contests, and promotions.  
10 Brooks Brothers recognizes that it must maintain and use customer information  
11 responsibly.”<sup>53</sup> Furthermore, Defendant also created a “special relationship” with  
12 Plaintiffs and Class Members who provided their information to Defendant and its  
13 affiliates, by playing a large role in creating and maintaining centralized computer  
14 systems and data security practices that were used for storage of all of Defendant’s  
15 customers’ PII.<sup>54</sup> Finally, Defendant also created a “special relationship” with  
16 Plaintiffs and Class Members whose PII was placed in the Defendant database due  
17 to their dealings with its affiliated companies, as stated by Brooks Brothers,  
18 “Brooks Brothers may share information with its subsidiaries and other affiliated  
19 companies, and with other carefully selected vendors and business partners with  
20 whom we work. This includes companies that perform fraud prevention/detection  
21 services; assist us in providing our products and services to you; assist in  
22 maintaining and managing customer information to provide customer and internet  
23 services; take and fulfill orders; conduct Brooks Brothers promotions and surveys;  
24 or assist us in more effectively communicating with our customers. All companies  
25 that act on our behalf are contractually obligated to keep all information  
26 confidential and to use the customer information only to provide the services we

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27 <sup>53</sup> **Ex. U.**

28 <sup>54</sup> *See Ex. U and V.*

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1 ask them to perform for you and us.”<sup>55</sup> Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ PII was  
2 placed in the Defendant’s and/or its affiliates’ database so that they tailor their  
3 marketing efforts to Plaintiffs and Class Members.

4 112. In addition, due to Defendant’s negligence, Plaintiffs and Class  
5 Members have suffered a loss of value in the form of diminution in the value of  
6 their PII. The diminution in the value of Plaintiffs and Class Members’ PII results  
7 in physical damage to their property, namely, their PII.

8 113. Defendant had a duty to timely disclose to Plaintiffs and Class  
9 Members that their PII had been or was reasonably believed to have been  
10 compromised. Timely disclosure was appropriate so that, among other things,  
11 Plaintiffs and Class Members could take appropriate measures to avoid use of bank  
12 funds and monitor their account information and credit reports for fraudulent  
13 activity.

14 114. Defendant breached its duty to discover and to notify Plaintiffs and  
15 Class Members of the unauthorized access by failing to discover the security  
16 breach within reasonable time and by failing to notify Plaintiffs and Class  
17 Members of the breach until May 2017. To date, Defendant has not provided  
18 sufficient information to Plaintiffs and Class Members regarding the extent and  
19 scope of the unauthorized access and continues to breach its disclosure  
20 obligations to Plaintiffs and the Class.

21 115. Defendant also breached its duty to Plaintiffs and Class Members to  
22 adequately protect and safeguard this information by knowingly disregarding  
23 standard information security principles, despite obvious risks, and by allowing  
24 unmonitored and unrestricted access to unsecured PII. Furthering its negligent  
25 practices, Defendant failed to provide adequate supervision and oversight of the  
26 PII, in spite of the known risk and foreseeable likelihood of breach and misuse,  
27

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28 <sup>55</sup> **Ex. U.**



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1 which permitted a third party to gather Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ PII, misuse  
2 the PII, and intentionally disclose it to others without consent.

3 116. Through Defendant’s acts and omissions described in this  
4 Complaint, including Defendant’s failure to provide adequate security and its  
5 failure to protect Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ PII from being foreseeably  
6 captured, accessed, disseminated, stolen, and misused, Defendant unlawfully  
7 breached its duty to use reasonable care to adequately protect and secure  
8 Plaintiffs and Class Members’ PII during the time it was within Defendant’s  
9 control.

10 117. Through Defendant’s acts and omissions as described in this  
11 Complaint, including Defendant’s failure to provide adequate security and its  
12 failure to protect Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ PII from being foreseeably  
13 captured, accessed, disseminated, stolen, and misused, Defendant unlawfully  
14 breached its duty to exercise reasonable care to adequately protect and secure  
15 Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ PII during the time it was within Defendant’s  
16 control.

17 118. Further, through its failure to timely discover and provide clear  
18 notification of the data breach to consumers, Defendant prevented Plaintiffs and  
19 Class Members from taking meaningful, proactive steps to secure their PII.

20 119. Upon information and belief, Defendant improperly and inadequately  
21 safeguarded the PII of Plaintiffs and Class Members and did so in a manner that  
22 deviated from standard industry rules, regulations, and practices at the time of the  
23 data breach.

24 120. Defendant’s failure to take proper security measures to protect  
25 Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ sensitive PII, as described in this Complaint,  
26 created conditions conducive to a foreseeable, intentional criminal act, namely the  
27 unauthorized access of Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ PII.  
28

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1 121. Defendant’s conduct was grossly negligent and departed from all  
2 reasonable standards of care, including, but not limited to: failing to adequately  
3 protect the PII; failing to conduct adequate regular security audits; and failing to  
4 provide adequate and appropriate supervision of persons having access to  
5 Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ PII.

6 122. Neither Plaintiffs nor the other Class Members contributed to the data  
7 breach and subsequent misuse of their PII as described in this Complaint.

8 123. Defendant failed to prevent the data breach, which makes Plaintiffs’  
9 and Class Members’ harm “fairly traceable” to conduct being challenged here.<sup>56</sup>

10 124. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s negligence, Plaintiffs  
11 and Class Members sustained actual losses and damages in an amount according  
12 to proof at trial but in excess of the minimum jurisdictional requirement of this  
13 Court.

14 **COUNT III**

15 **Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §**  
16 **17200 Unlawful Business Practices**

17 (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the California Class)

18 125. Plaintiffs allege and incorporates herein by reference each and every  
19 allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 124, inclusive, of this Complaint as  
20 if set forth fully herein.

21 126. Defendant has violated Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code §17200 et seq. by  
22 engaging in unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business acts and practices that  
23 constitute acts of “unfair competition” as defined in Cal. Bus. Prof. Code §17200.

24 127. Defendant violated Cal. Civ. Code Section 1798.81, which requires  
25 that “[a] business shall take all reasonable steps to dispose, or arrange for the  
26 disposal, of customer records within its custody or control containing personal  
27

28 <sup>56</sup> *Id.*

1 information when the records are no longer to be retained by the business by (a)  
2 shredding, (b) erasing, or (c) otherwise modifying the personal information in those  
3 records to make it unreadable or undecipherable through any means." Defendant  
4 violated Section 1798.81 by failing to erase or modify personal information, e.g.  
5 full names, credit card numbers, credit card verification codes, and zip codes, in its  
6 records of sales of goods to Plaintiffs. Instead, Defendant maintained its records  
7 in an unsecured electronic environment that left personal information susceptible  
8 to unauthorized access. Had the Defendant erased or modified the Plaintiffs'  
9 personal information, third-party hackers would not have been able to obtain  
10 Plaintiffs' full names, credit card numbers, credit card verification codes, and zip  
11 codes.

12 128. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's unlawful acts and  
13 practices, Plaintiffs and the Class Members were injured and lost money or  
14 property, including but not limited to the loss of their legally protected interest in  
15 the confidentiality and privacy of their PII, and additional losses described above.

16 129. Defendant also violated Cal. Civ. Code Section 1798.81.5(b), which  
17 states in relevant part, that a business that "maintains personal information about  
18 a California resident shall implement and maintain reasonable security  
19 procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information, to protect  
20 the personal information from unauthorized access, destruction, use,  
21 modification, or disclosure...." Personal information under the statute is "[a]n  
22 individual's first name or first initial and his or her last name in combination with  
23 any one or more of the following data elements, when either the name or the data  
24 elements are not encrypted or redacted" with "[a]ccount number, credit or debit  
25 card number, in combination with any required security code, access code, or  
26 password that would permit access to an individual's financial account." Cal.  
27 Civ. Code Section 1798.81.5(d)(1)(A)(iii). Defendant violated Section  
28 1798.81.5(b) by maintaining Plaintiffs' and Class Members' PII in an unsecure

1 electronic environment, and even when Defendant discovered the full scope of  
2 unauthorized access of Plaintiffs' and Class Members' PII and Defendant failed  
3 to notify Plaintiffs for approximately eight (8) months. Had the Defendant  
4 maintained the Plaintiffs' personal information, third-party hackers would not  
5 have been able to obtain Plaintiffs' full names, credit card numbers, credit card  
6 verification codes, and zip codes.

7 130. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's unlawful acts and  
8 practices, Plaintiffs and the Class Members were injured and lost money or  
9 property, including but not limited to the loss of their legally protected interest in  
10 the confidentiality and privacy of their PII, and additional losses described above.

11 131. In addition, Defendant engaged in unlawful acts and practices with  
12 respect to its services by failing to discover and then disclose the data breach to  
13 Plaintiffs and Class Members in a timely and accurate manner, contrary to the  
14 duties imposed by Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82(a), which requires that a "business  
15 that conducts business in California, and that owns or licenses computerized data  
16 that includes personal information, shall disclose a breach of the security of the  
17 system following discovery or notification of the breach in the security of the  
18 data to a resident of California (1) whose unencrypted personal information was,  
19 or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person, or,  
20 (2) whose encrypted personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have  
21 been, acquired by an unauthorized person and the encryption key or security  
22 credential was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an  
23 unauthorized person and the person or business that owns or licenses the  
24 encrypted information has a reasonable belief that the encryption key or security  
25 credential could render that personal information readable or useable. The  
26 disclosure shall be made in the most expedient time possible and without  
27 unreasonable delay, consistent with the legitimate needs of law enforcement, as  
28 provided in subdivision (c), or any measures necessary to determine the scope of

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1 the breach and restore the reasonable integrity of the data system." Defendant  
2 was in violation of this statute because it unnecessarily delayed disclosure to  
3 Plaintiffs of the data breach subject to this action. It still is in violation of this  
4 statute by failing to provide disclosure to Plaintiffs in a manner where they would  
5 reasonably see it.

6 132. To date, Defendant still has not provided sufficient information to  
7 Plaintiffs and the Class Members.

8 133. Plaintiffs and the Class Members seek relief under Cal. Bus. & Prof.  
9 Code § 17200, *et. seq.*, including, but not limited to, restitution to Plaintiffs and  
10 Class Members of money or property that Defendant acquired from Plaintiffs and  
11 the Class Members by means of its unlawful, and unfair business practices,  
12 declaratory relief, attorney’s fees and costs (pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §  
13 1021.5), and injunctive or other equitable relief.

14 **COUNT IV**

15 **Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code**  
16 **§17200 Unfair Business Practices**

17 (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the California Class)

18 134. Plaintiffs alleges and incorporates herein by reference each and every  
19 allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 133, inclusive, of this Complaint as  
20 if set forth fully herein.

21 135. Defendant engaged in unfair acts and practices by soliciting and  
22 collecting Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ PII with knowledge that the information  
23 would not be adequately protected while Plaintiffs’ and the Class Members’ PII  
24 would be processed in an unsecure electronic environment. These unfair acts and  
25 practices were immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, unconscionable,  
26 and/or substantially injurious to Plaintiffs and Class Members. They were likely  
27 to deceive the public into believing their PII was secure, when it was not. The  
28

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1 harm these practices caused to Plaintiffs and Class Members outweighed their  
2 utility, if any.

3 136. Defendant engaged in unfair acts and practices with respect to the  
4 provision of its services by failing to enact adequate privacy and security measures  
5 to protect Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII from further unauthorized disclosure,  
6 release, data breaches, and theft and by failing to timely discover and give notice  
7 of the data breach. These unfair acts and practices were immoral, unethical,  
8 oppressive, unscrupulous, unconscionable, and/or substantially injurious to  
9 Plaintiffs and Class Members. They were likely to deceive the public into believing  
10 their Private Identifiable Information was secure, when it was not. The harm these  
11 practices caused to Plaintiffs and the Class Members outweighed their utility, if  
12 any.

13 137. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s unfair practices and  
14 acts, Plaintiff and the Class Members were injured and lost money or property,  
15 including but not limited to the loss of their legally protected interest in the  
16 confidentiality and privacy of their PII, and additional losses described above.

17 138. Plaintiffs and the Class Members seek relief under Cal. Bus. & Prof.  
18 Code § 17200, *et. seq.*, including, but not limited to, restitution to Plaintiffs and  
19 Class Members of money or property that Defendant acquired from Plaintiffs and  
20 the Class Members by means of its unfair business practices, declaratory relief,  
21 attorney’s fees and costs (pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §1021.5), and injunctive  
22 or other equitable relief.

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**COUNT V**

**Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code  
§17200 Fraudulent/Deceptive Business Practices**

(On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the California Class)

139. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate herein by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 138, inclusive, of this Complaint as if set forth fully herein.

140. Defendant engaged in fraudulent and deceptive acts and practices by omitting, suppressing, and concealing the material fact of the inadequacy of the privacy and security protections for Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ PII. Defendant effectively concealed the inadequate security of Plaintiffs' personal information and the resultant data breach by embedding notice of the breach in a remote part of the Defendant's website.

141. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s deceptive practices and acts, Plaintiffs and the Class Members were injured and lost money or property, including but not limited to the loss of their legally protected interest in the confidentiality and privacy of their PII, and additional losses described above.

141. Plaintiffs and the Class Members seek relief under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, *et. seq.*, including, but not limited to, restitution to the Plaintiffs and Class Members of money or property that Defendant acquired from Plaintiffs and the Class Members by means of its fraudulent and deceptive business practices, declaratory relief, attorney’s fees and costs (pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §1021.5), and injunctive or other equitable relief.

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**COUNT VI**

**Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing**

(On Behalf of Plaintiffs, the Nationwide Class and the California Class)

142. Plaintiffs alleges and incorporates herein by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 141, inclusive, of this Complaint as if set forth fully herein.

143. The law implies a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract.

144. Plaintiffs and Class Members contracted with Defendant by accepting Defendant's offers and paying for products at Defendant's stores.

145. Plaintiffs and Class Members performed all of their duties under their agreements with Defendant.

146. All of the conditions required for Defendant's performance under the contract have occurred.

147. Defendant did not provide and/or unfairly interfered with and/or frustrated the right of Plaintiffs and the Class Members to receive the full benefits under their agreements.

148. Defendant breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in its contracts with Plaintiffs and the Class Members by failing to use and provide reasonable and industry-leading security practices to safeguard the PII of Plaintiffs and the Class Members.

149. Plaintiffs and the Class Members were damaged by Defendant's breach in that they paid for, but never received, the valuable security protections to which they were entitled.

150. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiffs and Class Members have suffered injury and are entitled to damages in an amount to be proven at trial but in excess of the minimum jurisdictional requirement of this Court.

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**COUNT VII**

**Violation of California Data Breach Act**

(On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the California Class)

151. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate herein by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 150, inclusive, of this Complaint as if set forth fully herein.

152. Defendant was required, but failed, to take all reasonable steps to dispose, or arrange for the disposal, of records within its custody or control containing PII when the records were no longer to be retained, by shredding, erasing, or otherwise modifying the personal information in those records to make it unreadable or undecipherable through any means.

153. Defendant’s conduct, as alleged herein above, violated California, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.80 *et. seq.*

154. Defendant was required, but failed, to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature and scope of the information compromised in the data breach.

155. The data breach constituted a “breach of the security system” within the meaning of section 1798.82(g) of the California Civil Code.

156. The information compromised in the data breach constituted “personal information” within the meaning of section 1798.80(e) of the California Civil Code.

157. California Civil Code § 1798.80(e) requires disclosure of data breaches “in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay....”

158. Defendant violated Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.80(e) by unreasonably delaying disclosure of the data breach to Plaintiffs and other Class Members, whose PII was, or was reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person.

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1 159. Upon information and belief, no law enforcement agency instructed  
2 Defendant that notification to Plaintiffs and Class Members would impede a  
3 criminal investigation.

4 160. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s violation of Cal. Civ.  
5 Code § 1798.80, *et seq.*, Plaintiffs and Class Members incurred economic damages,  
6 including expenses associated with monitoring their personal and financial  
7 information to prevent further fraud.

8 161. Plaintiffs and the Class Members seek all remedies available under  
9 Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.84, including, but not limited to: (a) actual damages suffered  
10 by Class Members as alleged above; (b) statutory damages for Defendant’s willful,  
11 intentional, and/or reckless violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.83; (c) equitable  
12 relief; and (d) reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under Cal. Civ. Code  
13 §1798.84(g).

14 162. In violating the California Data Breach Act, Defendant acted in a  
15 willful, wanton and malicious manner, in callous and conscious disregard for the  
16 rights and interests of Plaintiffs and the Class Members, and with knowledge that  
17 its conduct would substantially annoy, vex and damage Plaintiffs and the Class  
18 Members thereby entitling Plaintiffs and the Class Members to recover punitive  
19 and exemplary damages against Defendant pursuant to California Civil Code  
20 section 3294 in an amount according to proof at trial.

21 **VII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

22 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all Class Members,  
23 respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment in his favor and against  
24 Defendant as follows:

- 25 A. For an Order certifying the Nationwide Class and California Class as  
26 defined here, and appointing Plaintiffs and his Counsel to represent  
27 the Nationwide Class and the California Class;  
28

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- 1 B. For equitable relief enjoining Defendant from engaging in the
- 2 wrongful conduct complained of herein pertaining to the misuse
- 3 and/or disclosure of Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ PII, and from
- 4 refusing to issue prompt, complete, and accurate disclosures to
- 5 Plaintiffs and Class Members;
- 6 C. For equitable relief compelling Brooks Brothers to utilize
- 7 appropriate methods and policies with respect to consumer data
- 8 collection, storage, and safety and to disclose with specificity to
- 9 Class Members the type of PII compromised;
- 10 D. For restitution and disgorgement of the revenues wrongfully
- 11 obtained as a result of Defendant’s wrongful conduct;
- 12 E. For an award of actual damages and compensatory damages, in an
- 13 amount to be determined at trial;
- 14 F. For punitive and exemplary damages;
- 15 G. For an award of costs of suit, litigation expenses and attorneys’ fees,
- 16 as allowable by law; and
- 17 H. For such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and
- 18 proper.

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**VIII. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, hereby demands a jury trial for all claims so triable.

Dated: June 28, 2018

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Bobby Saadian

Bobby Saadian  
*Attorneys for Plaintiffs*

/s/ Thomas V. Girardi

Thomas V. Girardi  
*Attorneys for Plaintiffs*

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